EU zvažuje menší sankční balíčky proti Rusku, aby jedna země nemohla blokovat vše

Index ověření faktů: 64/100 — The article's core news claims about the EU weighing smaller sanctions tranches to blunt veto leverage after Greece's concessions are accurately supported by and correctly cited to the headline sources, but much of its substance is accurate legal background and analysis that the headline-only source material cannot verify.

• EU officials are weighing a shift to smaller, targeted sanctions tranches to blunt a single member state's leverage — Directly matches New Voice of Ukraine headline 'EU weighs smaller Russia sanctions packages to blunt national veto power,' correctly cited.
• Brussels is preparing to abandon the single all-at-once package format used since 2022 — Consistent with FT-attributed headlines 'EU may abandon large sanctions packages/large-scale sanctions'; the 'since 2022' framing is background but the abandonment claim is sourced.
• Attributed to the Financial Times as reported by The New Voice of Ukraine — Both the FT origin and NV relay match the provided headline attributions.
• The 21st package became law only after Greece extracted concessions — Headline 1 explicitly ties the shift to 'Greece's concessions'; the causal 'only after' is a reasonable reading.
• Proposed restrictions on Russian LNG and on tourism were among measures cut from the final text — None of the four provided source headlines mention LNG or tourism; this detail is attributed to the outlet's own earlier coverage, not the cited sources.
• FT frames the outcome as trigger for a potentially dramatic change of method, per RBC-Ukraine — Matches RBC-Ukraine headline 'EU sanctions policy against Russia could change dramatically — FT.'
• Sanctions are a Council decision under Article 29 TEU requiring unanimity of all 27, with a parallel Article 215 TFEU regulation — Accurate real-world EU legal fact but not present in the headline-only source material; presented as general knowledge, not misattributed.
• Existing measures must be renewed roughly every six months, also requiring unanimity — Correct as background on EU restrictive measures but not established by any provided source.
• Splitting packages into tranches does not change the unanimity threshold; each tranche still needs all 27 — Logical inference consistent with the veto framing in the sources, but the sources do not explicitly confirm the mechanism.
• The reporting describes a direction of travel, not an adopted decision, with no new legal act published — Consistent with the hedged 'may abandon,' 'weighs,' and 'could change' language of all four headlines.
• Unbundling weakens holdout states by denying them a large package to hold hostage (hypothesis) — Framed explicitly as the article's own hypothesis/analysis; the Greek-leverage premise is source-backed but the weighing of effects is editorial reasoning, not reporting.